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Abstract
We study the role of active and passive investors in an investment
market with uncertainties. Active investors concentrate on a single
or a few stocks with a given probability of determining the quality of
them. Passive investors spread their investment uniformly, resembling
buying the market index. In this toy market stocks are introduced as
good and bad. If a stock receives sufficient investment it will survive,
otherwise die. Active players exert a selective pressure since they can
determine to an extent the investment quality. We show that the
active players provide the driving force whereas the passive ones act
as free riders. While their gains do not differ too much, we show that
the active players enjoy an edge. Their presence also provides better
gains to the passive players and stocks themselves.
1 Introduction
In the standard finance literature, it is generally stated that competi-
tive financial markets are efficient and an arbitrage opportunity would
instantly disappear once smart investors act upon it. This goes under
the name of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) [1] [2]. The propo-
nents never specified how much a probabilistic edge would be reduced
and how many smart investors there should be to bring the market
to efficiency. The general conclusion they draw from such doctrine
is that active investors just waste their time, since nobody can earn
above-market gains. Practitioners, on the other hand, do not heed to
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such advice and it seems to be impossible to reconcile the academics
and practice.
Recently an alternative theory is put forward [3] [4] which main-
tains that probabilistic edge can never really disappear, but can only
be reduced. There is a quantitative relationship between the reduc-
tion and the amount of investment the active players commit. This
is called Marginally Efficient Market (MEM) theory. Under this gen-
eral framework in this paper we study the interplay of various players
in a toy stock market. Active investors hold relative focus; passive
ones just buy everything in the market; as well as the stocks which
can survive or die. In this market ecology we aim to understand
the interaction among various players, given the market uncertainties.
The salient features coming out from our investigation are: the active
players provide the driving force such that the market index can be
sustained to a higher level than random chance would warrant, the
passive players enjoy a free ride. In general we find that under quite
general conditions active players enjoy an edge over the market index
on which the passive players ride free, this provides incentives to the
active players to stay active. On the investment side the stocks are
not guaranteed of survival. The more the active players, the more of
the good stocks survive. So in this ecology all players benefit from
there being active players.
2 The model
In a market, investors can choose between two main strategies: either
they focus on some stock, study it in depth and then decide whether
to invest on it or not, or they can choose to be passive, and invest on
all the available stocks to safely enjoy the average gain (if any) thanks
to the central limit theorem. Stocks, on the other hand, can provide
positive or negative return, and we assume that their survival depends
on their capability to attract new investments.
We assume that there are I investors and S stocks in which they
can invest. Time is described by the integer variable t. Each stocks i
is associated with a spin variable σi = ±1, that describes its quality:
if σi = +1, the stock i is positive and it is good to invest on it, while
if σi = −1 the stock i is negative and one should not invest on it. An
investor can be active or passive. Each agent can invest at most a
unit at each time step. At each time step, he chooses the stocks to
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be included in his portfolio according to his active or passive strategy,
then invests an equal amount in each of them. We define the gain gα
of a given investor α by
gα =
∑S
i=1 f
α
i σi
P
, (1)
where fi = 1 if stock i has been included in the portfolio of investor
α and 0 otherwise, and P =
∑S
i f
α
i is the number of stocks included
in the portfolio. In other words, a portfolio gives a positive gain if it
includes more good stocks than bad ones.
Let us now define the two strategies. Passive investors want to take
advantage of the average return of the market. Therefore, they invest
a capital 1/S on each stock (fpassi = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . .) and P = S.
On the other hand, each active investor examines a single randomly
drawn stock and judges it. Once he has examined a given stock, he
invests all his unit on it if he thinks it is a good stock, otherwise he
does not invest at all. As we did in [4], we want to represent active
investors with bounded rationality, who may have a wrong perception
of stocks. We then assume that an active investor who examines a
given stock has a wrong perception of it with the probability D.
When all the investors have made their choice, stocks are selected
by the amount of the investment they manage to receive. Stocks that
fail to attract sufficient investment go bankrupt. Then, a stocks that
receives less investment than a fixed threshold T is replaced by a new
stock. The new stock is good with the probability p0 and bad with
probability 1−p0. This process is repeated many times, starting from
a random initial condition. We denote by p(t) the fraction of good
stocks at time t. The market performance is measured by the average
quality of the market, or index, 2p(t) − 1. The system, after a many
time steps, falls in a stationary state where the fraction of good stocks
fluctuate around p∗.
We assume that the fraction of active investors is ρ. Let us suppose,
for the time being, that ρ is fixed. We can compute the average gains
of active and passive investors. An active investor gets a gain of +1
if he examines a good stock and if his perception of the stock is right.
The probability to examine a good stock drawn at random is p(t),
and the probability to have a right perception of it is 1−D, then the
gain is equal to 1 with the probability p(t)(1−D). The same investor
has a negative return, that is, he loses 1, if he examines a bad stock,
but has a wrong perception of it and decides nevertheless to invest.
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Reasoning as above, one can see that this happens with probability
(1− p(t))D. Otherwise, he receives no return, and this case does not
give contribution to the average. Thus, the average gain of the active
investors at time t is gact = p(t)−D. On the other hand, the passive
investors enjoy the average behavior of the whole market and their
average gain at time t is gpass = 2p(t) − 1, If p(t) < 1 − D, which
implies gact > gpass, the active investors enjoy a greater gain than the
passive investors.
3 The stationary state
Let q(+)(t) (q(−)(t)) be the probability to go bankrupt for a good
(bad) stock at time t. In the following, we will drop the explicit time
dependence (if not necessary) to avoid a too heavy notation. At the
stationary state, where the number of good stock replaced by bad ones
equals the number of bad stocks replaced by good ones, we find
p∗q(+)(1− p0) = (1− p
∗)q(−)p0; (2)
From this, we obtain
p∗ = p0q
(−)/[(1− p0)q
(+) + p0q
(−)]. (3)
Let us consider a given bad stock and check its total investment re-
ceived to determine its fate. q(−) is the probability that a given bad
stock receives less than T units of investment. All stocks, bad or good,
enjoy the same investment coming from the passive investors, spread
out over all the market. This amount per stock is a constant equal to
T0 = I(1 − ρ)/S.
To fill the gap between T0 and the threshold T , the bad stock
should receive sufficient investment from the active investors who mis-
take the bad stock for good. The probability that k active investors
invest on a bad stock obeys a binomial distribution. Each active in-
vestor examines a stock with probability 1/S. If it is a bad stock,
the investor invests on it if he mistakes it, which happens with the
probability D. Then, the probability of receiving a unit of investment
from each active investor is D/S. The probability to receive k units of
investment from all active investors is b(k, ρI,D/S), where b(n,M, z)
is the usual binomial probability of observing n events on M trials, if
the probability of the single event is equal to z, i.e.
b(n,M, z) ≡
(
M
n
)
zn(1− z)M−n. (4)
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Then, the probability for a bad stock to go bankrupt is
q(−) =
T−T0∑
k=0
b(k, ρI,D/S). (5)
Likewise, the computation of the bankrupt probability for a good stock
q(+) gives
q(+) =
T−T0∑
k=0
b(k, ρI, (1 −D)/S). (6)
By means of the binomial distribution computed above, we can evalu-
ate the average investment received by each stock. From active agents,
each good stock receives on average (1−D)ρI/S and each bad stock
DρI/S. By adding T0 to both quantities, we obtain that each good
stock receives on average (1 − Dρ)I/S units of investment and each
bad stock receives [1−D(1− ρ)]I/S. By replacing eqs. (5) and (6) in
equation (3), we obtain
p∗ = p∗(ρ) =
p0
∑T−T0
k=0 b(k, ρI,D/S)∑T−T0
k=0 [(1− p0)b(k, ρI,D/S) + p0b(k, ρI, (1 −D)/S)]
.
(7)
The above formula can be easily verified by simulations. For different
values of T we obtain qualitatively different behaviors. If T > I/S,
i.e. if the market is under severe selective pressure, the market index
increases monotonically as a function of the number of active investors.
For low values of ρ, i.e. when active investors are rare, all stocks receive
about the same amount of investment, since the passive agents invest
the same quantity 1/S on each stock regardless its return. Thus, for
ρ = 0, each stock receives I/S < T investment and no one survives:
q(+) = 1, (8)
q(−) = 1. (9)
and
p∗ = p0. (10)
As ρ (the fraction of active investors) increases, investment is allocated
in a more selective way, since the active investors can distinguish to
a certain extent good from bad stocks. Thus, if there are more active
investors, good stocks have a higher probability to receive the minimal
T investment and then survive. The presence of the active investors
then gives an edge to the good stocks, and p increased with ρ as
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shown in figure 1. When D → 0 and T = I/S, the active investor
exercise the strongest selective pressure on the market (provided that
T > I/S), since they invest with great accuracy and the threshold is
exactly the average investment received by all stocks. In this situation,
the number of good stocks that receive less than T investment is the
minimal. We now ask whether the selective pressure on the market
can so strong that passive investor enjoy a greater gain than the active
ones. This happens if p∗ > 1−R in a market where active agents invest
with a very high precision, that is, D → 0.
Since p∗ is an increasing function of ρ, we check if the condition is
verified for ρ = 1. Replacing ρ = 1, D ≃ 0 and T = I/S in equation
(7), we obtain
p∗ ≃
p0
∑I/S
k=0 δ(k)
(1− p0)
∑I/S
k=0 δ(k) + p0
∑I/S
k=0 b(k, I, 1/S)
. (11)
The δ functions in equation (11) come from the limit
lim
z→0
b(n,M, z) = δ(n). (12)
Since
I/S∑
k=0
δ(k) = 1, (13)
and
I/S∑
k=0
b(k, I, 1/S) ≃
1
2
, (14)
we have, from equation (11),
p∗(ρ = 1) ≃
2p0
2− p0
. (15)
Thus, the condition p∗ > 1−D can be satisfied only if p0 > 2/3+O(ǫ).
If T < I/S, we observe a radically different behavior. If there is no
active investors (ρ = 0), each stock receives I/S > T investments,
thus all stocks survive and we have
q(+) = q(−) = 0. (16)
This remains true until the fraction of active investors is such that
(1− ρ)I/S ≥ T. (17)
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Then, there is a critical fraction of investors ρc such that if ρ < ρc
all stock receive more than the threshold investment. Equation (17)
implies ρc = 1 − ST/I. Beyond this value, the investment coming
from the passive agents is no more sufficient to keep all the investors
above the threshold T . As the number of active investors increases
over the value ρc, investment move from bad to good stocks, and the
bankrupt probability for a bad stocks grows much more than for the
good stocks, as one can see in figure 1. For higher values of ρ, however,
the fraction of good stocks p starts to decrease. Indeed, when there
are many active players bad stocks can take advantage of their more
frequent errors and the survival probability for a bad stock slightly
increases, as it is shown in figure 1.
4 Effort
Let us now define the effort E. We use the same notation of ref. [4]
and assume that the error probability D is a decreasing function of
the effort; we choose for simplicity
D = 1/(E + 2). (18)
Thus, E is positive definite and gives a measure of the skill of the
active investors, which is assumed to be constant for all the active
investors. If the active investors provide no effort (E = 0) they would
invest at random. Error would then be the largest (D = 12 ). On
the other hand, a perfect perception of the market cannot be reached
by a finite effort, since D = 0 corresponds to E = ∞. We want to
investigate the role of the effort in a market, where the fraction of
active investors is fixed and the system is in the stationary state. The
active investors’ ability to distinguish good stocks from bad ones is a
function of the effort they provide.
Let us consider the gain of an investor as a function of his effort
with ρ fixed. By replacing p(ρ) in the expressions of the gains gact
and gpass, one can show that both the gains of the active and passive
investors grow monotonically with E. This behavior is shown in figure
2.
We conclude that the effort by the active investors exercises a
selective pressure on the market performance. We notice that if the
active investors provide the minimal effort E = 2, which corresponds
to an error probability D = 1/2, the number of bad and good stocks
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weeded out of the market are equal, since both kinds of investors are
indifferent to the return of the stock on which they are investing.
We then generalize, by numerical simulation, our study of the mar-
ket assuming that the active agents invest on more than only one stock.
As we did in ref. [4], we assume that the missing information, mea-
sured by the error probability D, grows with the number of stocks
examined by the active investors, N and that a residual ignorance D0
remains also for N → 0, i.e.
D(N) = D0 +A
N
E
, (19)
where A is a constant determined by imposing D(S) = 1/2. This
means that an investors who examine all stocks actually behaves like
a random investor.
We see that the market performance of an active investor 2p − 1
has a maximum for a finite value 0 < Nopt < S, as it is shown in
figure 3.
Indeed, the of information needed to include more stock in a portfo-
lio then a tradeoff has to take place between the need of diversification
and the need of including good stocks in a portfolio. This confirms the
conclusions of [4] and [3], where the diversification of a portfolio is
found to be bounded by a finite cost of information about the stocks,
which acts as a source of inefficiency in a market.
5 Complex behavior of self organized
investors
Let us now suppose that the passive investors do not invest in all
stocks, but they choose at random the stocks to be included in their
portfolio. This is the easiest strategy to follow: such a noise trader
chooses its portfolio at random and invests on each stock with prob-
ability 1/2, regardless the stock is good or bad. Once he has chosen
the stocks, he invests an equal amount on each of them. As above,
the passive investors have a unit to invest, and they invest their en-
tire capital. An investor who follows this strategy enjoys the average
return of the market, after many time steps.
On the other hand, an active investor follows the same strategy as
in the previous model: he examines one single stock drawn at random
and, if he thinks that it is a good stock, he invests on it.
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We now allow investors to adapt and change strategy when their
last investment gives a non positive gain, so that the density of active
investors ρ(t) changes with time: if an investor enjoys a null or negative
gain, he switches to the other strategy with the probability ρ0. As
above, we study the properties of the system in the stationary state,
where ρ(t) and p(t) start oscillating around their stationary values ρ∗
and p∗ respectively.
By numerical simulation shown in figure ??, we observe that the
fraction of passive investors 1−ρ∗ at the stationary state increases with
the effort of the active investors. Likewise, the market performance
increases with the effort of the active investors, as do the average gains
of active and passive investors.
This can be qualitatively interpreted by a simple argument. The
active investors have a clear advantage if their effort is increased, since
they invest in the market with a higher precision. But the passive in-
vestors as well take advantage of the effort: the better the active
investors work, the easier is the life for the passive investors, so that
their population increases. If there are many active investors, the mar-
ket becomes more selective and the fraction of good stock increases.
This allows more passive strategies to reach a better results and grow
in number. As a non trivial results, it appears that the more the active
investors are successful, i.e. invest with a greater accuracy, the more
the passive investors are favored.
6 Approximated analysis of the self or-
ganized model
The properties at the stationary state can be approximately computed.
We study the stationary state of the system as a function of the effort
provided by the active investors, whose expression, from equation (18)
can be written as E = D−1 − 2. We note by τa the probability that
an active strategy obtains a negative or null gain, and with τf the
same probability for an average strategy. At the stationary state, the
numbers of agents who switch from active to passive strategy and from
passive to active strategy must be the same.
The probability that an active investor switches to a passive strat-
egy is equal to τact(p) = D(1 − ρ0)(1 − p), i.e. the product of the
probability (1 − p) of examining a bad stock, the probability D of
having a wrong perception of that stock and the probability 1− ρ0 of
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replacing an active strategy with a passive one.
On the other hand, a passive investor does not include a fixed
number of stocks in his portfolio. Let us assume that he invests on n
stocks. In such a case, the probability to include m bad stocks is a
binomial one, b(m,n, p). Thus, for a given n, the probability to obtain
a negative gain is τpass(p) =
∑
m<n/2 b(m,n, p). The probability to
invest over n stocks drawn at random obeys a binomial distribution,
P (n) = b(n, S, 1/2). Then, we can average τpass over all values of n,
and we obtain
τpass(p) =
∑
n
P (n)
∑
m<n/2
b(m,n, p). (20)
By imposing the detailed balance condition
(1− ρ)τpass(p) = ρτact(p), (21)
we can compute the active investors fraction at the stationary state,
ρ∗ as a function of the fraction of good stocks at the stationary state,
p∗. Indeed, he stationary state condition implies
ρ∗ =
ρ0τ
pass(p∗)
(1− ρ0)τact(p∗) + ρ0τpass(p∗)
. (22)
One can proceed as above to write a detailed balance equation for
the stocks. A given stock is replaced if it receives investment less
than T . As seen above, the number of stocks included in its portfolio
obeys a binomial distribution with mean value S/2. Let us assume
that all the passive investors invest on S/2 stocks, investing 2/S on
each stock. Under this assumption, a stock included in the portfolio
of Sx/2 passive investors receives from them an investment equal to
x. Thus, the probability Q<(m) that a given stock receives from the
passive agents an investment less than m is equal to the probability
to be included in the portfolio of less than Sm/2 passive agents over
(1 − ρ)I. The probability to be included in the portfolio of k passive
investors is b(k, (1−ρ)I, 1/2). Thus, the probability that a given stock
receives less than m investment from the passive investors is equal to
Q<(m) =
Sm/2∑
k=0
b(k, (1 − ρ)I,
1
2
). (23)
The probability Q<(m) does not depend on the quality of the stock,
since this investment comes from the agents who invest at random on
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good and bad stocks. The active investors, conversely, provide an ef-
fort E in examining the quality of stocks. The probability that a given
good stock receives an investment from an active agent is (1−D)/S,
where 1/S is the probability to be examined by the active investor and
(1−D) is the probability to be exactly judged, i.e. that the investor
has a correct perception of the good stock and invests on it. Therefore,
the probability that a good stock receives l investments from the ρI
active investors is R(+)(l) = b(l, ρI,D/S). Likewise, for a bad stock
we obtain R(−)(l) = b(l, ρI, (1 −D)/S). Then, the probability that a
stock receives less than T is
q(+) =
T∑
l=0
R(+)(l)Q<(T − l), (24)
and
q(−) =
T∑
l=0
R(−)(l)Q<(T − l), (25)
for good and bad stocks. We notice that these two probabilities are
functions of ρ. They allow us to write
p∗ = p∗(ρ∗) =
p0q
(−)(ρ∗)
p0q(+)(ρ∗) + (1− p0)q(−)(ρ∗)
(26)
and, by replacing ρ∗ = ρ∗(p∗) from equation (22), we obtain a self-
consistent equation for p∗, that can be solved numerically but exactly.
As a consequence, we can plot p∗ and ρ∗ as functions of the effort E.
The results are verified by numerical simulation.
7 Conclusion
We describe the statistical properties of a simplified market model
composed by investors and stocks. Stocks can only be good or bad,
according to the sign of their return. Investors can be active, i.e.
study the stocks and invest on the positive ones, or passive, that is,
behave as free riders and take advantage of the market performance,
without any selective effort. We investigate the stationary state of this
model. First we consider a fixed population of active investors, and
we select stocks according to the investment they manage to attract.
We observe by numerical and analytical means that increasing the
fraction of active investors improve the market performance, which
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can be exploited as well by passive investors. Second, we consider a
model in which investors can switch from active to passive strategy
and vice versa. We observe that as the accuracy of active investors
is increased, the population of passive investors grows. We can then
conclude that active and passive investors live in a sort of symbiosis,
although the two kinds of investors are in competition (selective force
vs diversification). Indeed, the gain of the active agents, due to an
increased accuracy, can result in a greater gain for the free riders as
well, due to a better performance of the whole market.
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Figure 1: Market Performance at the stationary state as a function of the
active investor fraction in a model with I = 1000, S = 100, p0 = 0.5, T = 11
(circles) and T = 9 (plus), according to equation 11
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Figure 2: Average Gain of active (solid line) and passive (dashed line) in-
vestors as a function of the effort E of the active investors, in a model with
ρ = 0.1, I = 500, S = 100, T = 5, p0 = 0.5
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Figure 3: Market performance as a function of the diversification of active
strategies with ρ = 0.2, I = 500, S = 100, T = 5, p0 = 0.5
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Ng/Na = 500/100; T = 5. E = 1/D −2
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Figure 4: Passive investors fraction (solid line: theory, circles simulation),
positive stock fraction (short dashed line,squares), active (dashed line, dia-
monds) and passive (long-dashed line, triangles) investor fraction as a func-
tion of the effort E in the self organized model, with I = 500, S = 100,
T = 5, p0 = 0.5
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